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Well-being, political decentralisation and governance quality 
in Europe 
Abstract 
European nations allocate public sector resources with the general aim of increasing 
the well-being and welfare of their citizens through a fair and efficient distribution of 
these public goods and services. However, ‘who’ delivers these goods and services 
and ‘how well’ they are delivered are essential in determining outcomes in terms of 
well-being. Drawing on data from the European Social Survey database, this paper 
uses Amartya Sen’s social welfare index framework – accounting for the trade-off 
between the maximization of public sector resources and an equitable distribution of 
these resources – to examine the influence of political decentralisation (‘who’ 
delivers the resources) and whether this influence is moderated by governance 
quality (‘how well’ they are delivered) on individual subjective well-being. The 
findings of the econometric analysis reveal that decentralisation does not always 
lead to higher well-being, as the benefits of political decentralisation are highly 
mediated by the quality of national governance. In countries with high governance 
quality, political decentralisation results in a greater satisfaction with health 
provision, while in lower quality governance countries, a more decentralized 
government can increase the overall satisfaction with life, the economy, 
government, democracy and the provision of education, but not necessarily with 
health-related services. 
Keywords: well-being, political decentralisation, quality of governance, Europe, 
European Social Survey 
JEL classification: I31; H70; H11  
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1. Introduction 
European nations allocate tangible and intangible public sector resources (e.g. public 
transport, public health, public housing and national security), paid for or controlled 
by public sector agencies, with the general aim of increasing the welfare and well-
being of their citizens. The distribution of public goods and services is generally 
aimed at achieving both a fairer (leading to lower inequality) and more efficient 
(leading to higher well-being overall) distribution of social welfare. However, some 
nations have been more successful at increasing efficiency and/or reducing 
interpersonal inequalities in well-being (e.g. by reducing inequalities in income, 
education, and in access to health) than others. The geographically uneven capacity 
of nations to jointly deal with both efficiency and equity issues raises profound 
challenges for researchers and policy-makers seeking to better understand what 
determined citizen’s well-being. 
Differences in well-being efficiency and equity outcomes across countries are often 
determined by two factors: i) ‘who’ delivers the public sector resources, i.e. whether 
the allocation of public goods and services is conducted at the national, regional or 
local level (Bjørnskov, Drehe, and Fischer 2008; Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose 
2012; Rodríguez-Pose and Maslauskaite 2012); and ii) ‘how well’ these goods and 
services are provided (Hessami 2010; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 2014; Rodríguez-
Pose and Di Cataldo 2015). Both the level of political decentralisation of a country 
and the overall efficiency and quality of the administration in charge can play an 
important role in determining the well-being of its citizens. In particular, the 
effectiveness of ‘who’ supplies the public goods and services and sets the rules that 
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govern social and economic activity for the well-being of the individuals living in any 
given territory can be affected by ‘how well’ this is done. This raises a number of 
questions: is it better for overall well-being to have public goods and services mostly 
delivered by national or, conversely, subnational governments?; and to what extent 
does the quality local governments, in particular, and of overall governance, in 
general, influence the relationship between political decentralisation and citizen’s 
well-being? 
In this paper, we argue that any potential well-being benefits related to the transfer 
of powers to subnational tiers of government and to providing public goods and 
services at the local level may not emerge because of governance problems. These 
aspects have until now attracted relatively limited attention (e.g. Hessami 2010; 
Kyriacou, Muinelo-Gallo, and Roca-Sagales 2015). 
We base our concept of well-being on Amartya Sen’s (1974, 1976) social welfare 
framework, which accounts for the trade-off between the maximization of public 
sector resources and an equitable distribution across the population of these 
resources. We operationalize Sen’s framework at the European level by means of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) dataset. These data allows us to create a number of 
well-being proxy variables, mirroring Sen’s social welfare index. Hooghe et al.’s 
(2016) regional authority index is used as our measure of political decentralisation 
(‘who’ delivers the resources), while governance quality (indicating ‘how well’ they 
are delivered) is measured by means of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2010) 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The influence of political decentralisation 
on well-being and the mediating role of governance quality are estimated by means 
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of econometric analysis using an interaction model, for the period between 1997 and 
2014. 
The main contributions of the paper centre on the following aspects. First, the paper 
uses the multidimensionality of Sen’s social welfare conceptual framework, by 
considering different dimensions of subjective welfare – usually equated to ‘well-
being’, which is concerned with a person’s achievement, i.e. how ‘well’ is his/her 
‘being’ (Sen 1985) – such as life-, economy-, government-, democracy-, education-, 
health-, and happiness-related subjective well-being aspects.
1
 This is in contrast to 
most previous scholarly work, which has tended to measure Sen’s social welfare by 
means of objective indices (e.g. Ezcurra, Gil, and Pascual 2005; Ram 1992; Rodríguez-
Pose and Tselios 2015). Moreover, the links between the subjective well-being 
approach, and specifically happiness economics, and Sen’s approach remain 
underexplored (Comim 2008). The measurement of subjective welfare or well-being 
in this paper is based on self-reported satisfaction or happiness measures.
2
 We 
examine how different levels of political decentralisation affect a fair and efficient 
distribution of all of the above aspects of well-being and whether this potential 
influence is shaped by the quality of local governance. The paper also aims to 
                                                          
1
 Resorting to Sen’s social welfare conceptual framework using subjective measures can have 
significant advantages, but is also not devoid of problems. Sen himself does not favour a 
subjective appraisal of well-being. That represents a problem for the adaptation of his 
framework. However, a subjective approach can complement information extracted using an 
objective one and add greater nuance. This may compensate for the fact that often 
subjective indicators do not necessarily replicate exactly objective ones. But neither 
objective nor subjective capability analyses can always adequately capture all the 
dimensions that shape individual well-being. Hence, “a list of central human capabilities […] 
can be seen as an entry point for ‘asking the questions’ rather than ‘giving the answers’” 
(Comim 2008: 153), when it comes to exploring subjective well-being. 
 
2
 The use of subjective indices to measure subjective welfare has advantages, but also faces 
the risks that responses may vary depending on the understanding or interpretation of 
individual participants of the specific questions on which the survey is based. 
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increase our understanding of the role that equity and efficiency play in the 
functioning and performance of variations in well-being by providing evidence of the 
interaction between ‘who’ and ‘how well’ the resources are delivered. The 
overarching aim of the research is to strengthen the capacity of political 
decentralisation and quality of governance to formulate policies aimed at achieving 
more prosperous and cohesive communities and a greater equalisation of subjective 
welfare at a time when territorial differences in well-being are creating growing 
social and political upheaval (Rodríguez-Pose 2018). 
To achieve this aim, the paper adopts the following structure. The section after the 
introduction reviews Sen’s (1974, 1976, 1973) social welfare index. The theoretical 
linkages between political decentralisation and subjective welfare and the mediating 
role of governance quality are also discussed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the 
proxies used to measure well-being, political decentralisation, and quality of 
governance, and then presents the empirical specification used to test the 
relationship between political decentralisation and well-being. It also looks at 
whether this relationship differs between low- and high-quality of governance, after 
controlling for country-specific socioeconomic characteristics. The regression results 
are discussed in Section 4. The final section sums up the analysis and considers the 
implications of the results for social welfare policies. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Sen’s social welfare index 
Published studies on welfare can be divided into two groups: studies that measure 
welfare as a subjective variable (i.e. perceived welfare or well-being) and studies that 
measure welfare as an objective variable (i.e. factual welfare) (Mishan 1974). From 
an analytical perspective, the main problem of the concept of welfare is that it is 
extremely difficult to operationalise (Sen 1973). Several indices have been proposed, 
but Sen’s (1973, 1974, 1976) social welfare index is still the most widely used. Sen’s 
index accounts for the trade-off between the maximisation of benefits (i.e. 
economic, social and political benefits), on the one hand, and an equitable 
distribution of those benefits, on the other. Vis-à-vis alternative indices that rely too 
a much larger extent on GDP – widely acknowledged as a poor measure of social 
welfare (England 1998; Torras 2008) – Sen’s index has the advantage that it places 
equal weight on the distributional effects of wealth. We therefore rely on Sen’s index 
as our indicator of social welfare for our measurement of perceived or subjective 
welfare or, in other word, well-being. 
Social welfare is shaped by what Amartya Sen (1985) labelled capabilities and 
functionings (Muller and Trannoy 2011). Capabilities are what people are able to do 
or able to be, while functionings represent the things a person actually does and 
experiences.
3
 Income – which is a key variable in Sen’s social welfare index and, 
according to him, is a mean and not an achievement – only represents one 
                                                          
3
 For a review of the capabilities indicators see the work by Anand et al. (2009). 
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dimension of these capabilities and functionings. This has been acknowledged in 
developing indicators, such as the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) that adopts 
a more encompassing view of development. The HDI is based on three attributes: 
real GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (income), education – measured by 
the adult literacy rate and of the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross 
enrolment ratios – and health – proxied by life expectancy at birth. Hence, in a 
similar way to economic development, social welfare encompasses much more than 
income.
4
 Education and health, among a raft of other factors, determine in no mean 
way the well-being of individuals. This is why in this paper we use Sen’s conceptual 
framework of social welfare and consider factors such as overall life-satisfaction, 
government and democratic quality, education, health, and happiness as major 
ingredients of the capabilities and functionings that inform citizen’s perceived 
welfare or well-being. All these factors are based on self-reported satisfaction and 
happiness measures, an approach that Sen himself does not favour (see footnote 1). 
However, the use of subjective indicators can contribute to create a substantive, not 
formal, account of well-being, allowing us to analyse the individual’s behaviour and 
choices in different but complementary way to that derived from the use of 
objective indicators. 
The measures of well-being used in this article are self-reported and may be subject 
to issues of adaptive preferences (Elster 1983; Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2000) and to 
problems of endogeneity (Anand, Krishnakumar, and Tran 2011). As a consequence, 
more ‘objective’ alternatives have been sought in order to evaluate people’s well-
being in terms of capabilities and functionings (Teschl and Comim 2005; Comim 
                                                          
4
 The 2010 Human Development Report introduced an inequality-adjusted HDI. 
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2008; Gasper 2007). For example, Teschl and Comim (2005) point out that an 
alternative way to assess people’s subjective well-being – although more in line with 
the capability approach – is Daniel Kahneman’s (1999) objective happiness approach 
where a person’s objective happiness level at a moment is defined as the extent to 
which he wants the experience he is having at that moment to continue. Another 
option is, for example, Székely, Foster and López-Calva’s (2005) inequality adjusted 
HDI (i.e. a new parametric class of human development indices that includes the 
original HDI as well as a family of distribution sensitive indices that satisfy all the 
basic properties for an index of human development). Other authors tend to adopt 
alternative approaches, including different considerations for selecting capabilities 
for quality of life measurement (Robeyns 2005) or distinguishing between different 
capabilities when comparing subjective with objective measures (Anand and van 
Hees 2006). Other studies (e.g. Anand, Krishnakumar, and Tran 2011; Anand et al. 
2009) argue that within the conventions of individual, household and social surveys, 
human capabilities can be measured with the aid of suitably designed statistical 
indicators, such as income or related socioeconomic indicators. However, these so-
called ‘more objective’ options are also not themselves exempt from problems, 
meaning that using self-reported data on well-being has now become mainstream in 
social science research (Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997). The number of papers 
using this type of data is now legion (e.g. Anand et al. 2009; Anand, Krishnakumar, 
and Tran 2011; Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose 2015). As self-reported well-being 
may be affected by the personality of the individual being surveyed or by the 
conditions of the place where he or she lives and taking into account that most of 
the well-being variables used in the analysis are aggregated at country-level, we 
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control for a number of country-specific factors that may influence individual 
responses.  
One of the main points that behavioural economics and the happiness literature has 
been stressing since Easterlin’s paradox (Clark 2016) is that subjective well-being 
assessments are not absolute and relative concerns can affect judgements.
5
 This 
aspect is not mitigated by considering regional or country level variables. Richer 
regions might present lower subjective well-being due to different reference points.  
Overall, we feel that we use a ‘pluralistic’ capabilities and functionings approach to 
personal well-being – involving life-satisfaction, government, democracy, education, 
health, and happiness as major ingredients of personal well-being
6
 – can provide a 
more accurate picture of the true level of well-being of individuals in a given country. 
Income, by contrast, can be a misleading indicator of well-being. 
2.2 The effect of political decentralisation on well-being 
Political decentralisation, i.e. ‘who’ delivers public resources, can strongly determine 
subjective welfare outcomes. It refers to the degree to which a central government 
allows subnational government tiers, such as regional and municipal governments, 
to undertake the political functions of governance (Pike et al. 2012). The key aim of 
decentralisation is to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in 
public decision-making, promoting pluralistic politics and representative 
                                                          
5
 We would like to thank an associate editor for this point. 
 
6
 The inclusion of these dimensions has been considered taking into account the 
multidimensional nature of capabilities and functionings as well as data availability in the ESS 
database (European Social Survey Round 7 Data 2014) (see Section 3.1). 
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government, and supporting democratisation. Although there are virtually as many 
forms of political decentralisation as the number of countries that exist in the world, 
political decentralisation requires, to a greater or lower degree, constitutional, legal 
and regulatory enshrinement, the development of a pluralistic political system, the 
strengthening of legislatures, the creation of local and regional political units, and 
the encouragement of effective public interest groups.
7
 
The relationship between political decentralisation and well-being has not attracted 
much attention and, in the limited past research available, the connection between 
both factors remains unclear. On the one hand, decentralisation may lead to higher 
well-being (through higher efficiency and/or equity) because it can provide 
information advantages and better insight into the preferences of citizens. 
Decentralisation also increases competition among jurisdictions, which can, in turn, 
lead to increases in the efficient provision of public goods and services, to 
improvements in the transfers from rich to poor, and to increases in participation, 
transparency and accountability in policy-making. By bringing government closer to 
the people, decentralisation can increase social capital and make the welfare state 
more participatory and responsive to differences in the needs and preferences of 
citizens living in different territories (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010, 2011; Tselios 
et al. 2012; Costa-Font 2010). 
On the other hand, decentralisation can also result in lower well-being (through 
lower efficiency and/or equity). The mechanisms through which it can undermine 
individual well-being are linked to the loss of economies of scale, especially in 
                                                          
7
 http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/political.htm  
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regions with already existing pockets of extreme poverty. Decentralisation very often 
also reduces the political influence of poorer regions over the allocation of financial 
resources and transfers, generating greater inequities between poorer and richer 
regions (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010, 2011; Tselios et al. 2012). 
 Therefore, the relationship between political decentralisation and individual well-
being cannot be assessed a priori and requires additional empirical scrutiny. 
2.3 The mediating role of governance quality 
A key factor that limits the possibility of establishing a clear cut relationship between 
political decentralisation and well-being is related to local governance quality. The 
quality of institutions, in general, and the quality of governance, in particular, i.e. 
‘how well’ the public goods and services are delivered, is central to understanding 
the extent to which political decentralisation can affect, if at all, individual well-
being. The World Bank WGI (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010) decomposes 
governance quality into six basic ‘pillars’ – voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption. These indicators have become widely 
considered as the most accurate and reliable measures of national governance and 
will be used as such in the analysis. 
But how does governance quality affect well-being? It is generally assumed that 
good governance positively influences the capacity of governments to efficiently and 
equitably deliver public goods and services, meaning that good governance shapes 
well-being. First, high-quality institutions usually lead to a better design and 
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implementation of public policies and a better provision of public goods and services 
which, in turn, result in higher economic growth and development (Acemoglu and 
Johnson 2005; Amin and Thrift 1994). Places with governments that are capable of 
designing and implementing effective policies, while, at the same time, keeping 
corruption at bay, are much more innovative and efficient than those where 
corruption is rife and governments ineffective (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo 2015). 
Generally, countries and regions with weak or inefficient institutions suffer from 
pervasive corruption, rent-seeking, insider-outsider problems, and clientelism and 
nepotism. Different combinations of these problems make for imperfectly 
functioning markets, institutional and government failure and loss of efficiency and 
growth potential. In countries with good institutions, macroeconomic stability 
generally ensues, which supports entrepreneurship, innovation and knowledge 
spillovers. The overall result is greater efficiency and growth. 
Second, governments that adequately design and efficiently deliver public goods and 
policies usually increase equity. Accountable and transparent governments, staffed 
by well-trained civil servants and led by trust-worthy politicians who have the 
interests of the local community at heart, will, in all likelihood, design and implement 
policies and deliver public goods and services that are needed by the citizenry, 
benefitting the community as a whole and thus reducing inequalities (Rodríguez-
Pose and Garcilazo 2015). This creates opportunities for weakening the hold of local 
elites and empowering underrepresented groups in society, including the poor, 
those less well-off, and local marginal groups (Brenner 2004; Le Galès 2002). 
Moreover, good governance facilitates negotiation and dialogue, mobilizes 
stakeholders and integrates them into the development process. It also enhances 
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policy contiguity and strengthens the voice of people and territories, reducing 
territorial and interpersonal inequalities (Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, and Tomaney 2017). 
In contrast, unaccountable and poorly staffed governments with inept or corrupt 
politicians at the helm will, in all likelihood, deliver policies for a small, self-serving 
local elite, contributing to an increase in inequalities. Hence, greater individual and 
collective well-being is usually associated with nations with healthy governance 
institutions. 
Overall, hence, governance quality at the local level can alter how different levels of 
decentralisation – or who is responsible for the design and implementation of public 
policies – may impinge on citizen’s well-being. Taking into account the positive 
relationship between well-being and the quality of institutions, if decentralised 
governments lower the overall quality of government intervention, political 
decentralisation may end up being detrimental for individual well-being in some 
countries. If, by contrast, local governments are of a similar or higher quality than 
central governments, the effect on well-being may be the opposite. Therefore, the 
questions of ‘who’ delivers social welfare and ‘how well’ it is delivered should be 
considered simultaneously. In other words, there is a need to examine the effects of 
decentralisation and quality of governance on well-being, both independently and 
through their interaction, as a means to assess the marginal effect of political 
decentralisation on subjective welfare due to variations in government quality. 
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3. Data and model 
3.1 Data 
In order to assess whether differences in governance quality deliver better or worse 
results depending on the level of decentralisation, we resort to the ESS database 
(European Social Survey Round 7 Data 2014) to proxy for individual well-being. The 
ESS database includes data for 36 countries
8
 between 2002 and 2014. We use Sen’s 
(1974, 1976) social welfare conceptual framework by considering that individual 
well-being goes beyond the levels and distribution of GDP and income in a territory 
and examine seven different dimensions of subjective welfare which rely on the 
subjective assessment of individuals of their own well-being. These dimensions cover 
different but core aspects of functionings and capabilities. One fundamental reason 
for accounting for seven different dimensions of well-being is to give a broader 
epistemological and empirical footing to the subjective social welfare concept and to 
reflect the variety of realms that define well-being (Alkire 2002; Alkire 2007). Table 1 
displays the well-being dimensions considered in the paper. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
The economy- (‘how satisfied are you with the present state of economy in your 
country?’), government- (‘how satisfied are you with your national government?’), 
democracy- (‘how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?’), 
                                                          
8
 Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United 
Kingdom. 
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education- (‘how satisfied are you with the state of education in country 
nowadays?’), and health- (‘how satisfied are you with the state of health services in 
your country nowadays’) measures of well-being are country-related proxies. The 
life-related (‘how satisfied are you with life as a whole?’) and happiness-related 
(‘how happy are you?’) well-being measures are people-related proxies. 
Using Sen’s welfare index, the average well-being level (W) of a country   at time t 
can be estimated by: 
!",# = $",#(1 % &",#) 
where $" is the mean satisfaction or happiness of individuals in country   at time t 
and &" is the Gini coefficient of the individual satisfaction or happiness distribution in 
country   at time t.9 $" denotes the efficiency of country   at time t and 1 % &"  
depicts the equity in the country at that time. Overall, not only the level of 
satisfaction/happiness, but also how that satisfaction/happiness is distributed across 
the population determines the levels of country well-being.  
Political decentralization is proxied using the regional authority index (RAI), as 
defined by Hooghe et al. (2016). The RAI includes data for all countries of the ESS 
database – with the exception of Ukraine and Kosovo – for the period between 1950 
and 2010. The RAI covers two dimensions of regional autonomy: a) ‘self-rule’, which 
refers to the authority of a regional government over those living in the region and 
taps regional authority over institutional depth (i.e. the extent to which a regional 
government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated), policy scope (i.e. the range 
                                                          
9
 In this case inequality comparisons with categorical data can be made, as all answers range 
from 0 to 10. Cowel and Flachaire (2012) address the problem of how to interpret a 
distribution of inequality measured as ordinal data as categorical variables. 
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of policies for which a regional government is responsible), fiscal autonomy (i.e. the 
extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population), 
borrowing autonomy (i.e. the extent to which a regional government can borrow), 
and representation (i.e. the extent to which a region is endowed with an 
independent legislature and executive); and b) ‘shared-rule’, which refers to the 
authority a regional government co-exercises in the country as a whole and taps 
regional authority over law-making (i.e. the extent to which regional representatives 
co-determine national legislation), executive control (i.e. the extent to which a 
regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings), 
fiscal control (i.e. the extent to which regional representatives co-determine the 
distribution of national tax revenues), borrowing control (i.e. the extent to which a 
regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing 
constraints), and constitutional reform (i.e. the extent to which regional 
representatives co-determine constitutional change). In this paper, we use the 
aggregate ‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’ score which make up the overall RAI. This 
index is primarily a political decentralisation proxy with some administrative and 
fiscal decentralisation components. Moreover, the transfer of powers to subnational 
tiers of government (i.e. political decentralisation) goes hand-in-hand with the 
transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government (i.e. fiscal decentralisation) 
and with the transfer of administration to subnational tiers of government (i.e. 
administrative decentralisation). This political decentralisation proxy has now been 
used in many empirical studies (e.g. Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2010; Tselios et al. 
2012; Tselios and Tompkins 2017). 
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Governance quality is proxied using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). The 2015 version of the 
dataset covers aggregate governance indicators for all countries of the ESS database 
from 1996 to 2014. According to this database, governance can be broadly defined 
as the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes a) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies, and c) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. The 
indicators used reflect the statistical compilation of responses on governance quality 
gathered from a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents 
in developed and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, 
think tanks, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations. The 
WGI project constructs aggregate indicators of the following six broad dimensions of 
governance: a) voice and accountability: perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media; b) political stability 
and absence of violence/terrorism: perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism; c) government effectiveness: 
perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies; d) regulatory quality: perceptions of the ability of governments to formulate 
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and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development; e) rule of law: perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence; and f) control of corruption: perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). All these indicators range from 
values of a minimum of -2.5 (weak) to a maximum of 2.5 (strong) governance 
performance. 
Data on the controls were obtained from the Penn World Table (PWT)
10
 database 
(Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015) (1950-2014) and the World Bank (WB) 
database (1960-2014). The control variables capture the main structural and 
socioeconomic features of individual countries and take into account some 
important sources of heterogeneity. These variables are: a) the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita at constant national prices (source: PWT) (e.g. Bardhan 2002); b) an 
index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling (Barro and Lee 2013) 
and returns to education (Psacharopoulos 1994) (source: PWT) (e.g. Faguet 2013); c) 
welfare-relevant total factor productivity (tfp) at constant national prices (source: 
PWT) (e.g. Thießen 2003);
11
 d) the natural logarithm of openness (source: PWT) (e.g. 
                                                          
10
 The PWT version 9.0 is a database with information on relative levels of income, output, 
inputs and productivity, covering 182 countries between 1950 and 2014. 
 
11
 The difference between tfp and welfare-relevant tfp is the tfp is based on relative real GDP 
from the output side, while welfare-relevant tfp is based on relative real domestic 
absorption (Basu et al. 2012). Thus welfare-relevant tfp is constructed with prices and 
quantities as perceived by consumers, not firms (Basu et al. 2012). 
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Dluhosch and Horgos 2013; Hessami 2011); e) tax revenue (% of GDP) (source: WB) 
(e.g. Hessami 2010); f) public health expenditure (% of total health expenditure) 
(source: WB) (e.g. Faguet 2013); g) the natural logarithm of unemployment (% of 
total labour force) (source: WB); and h) urban population (% of total) (source: WB) 
(e.g. Henderson 2002). 
The resulting dataset of combining these five datasets – ESS, Hooghe et al. (2016), 
WGI, PWT and WB – is an unbalanced database which is amenable to estimation 
methods that manage potential heterogeneity bias (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 
2009). Table 2 presents the number of observations, the mean, the standard 
deviation, and the minimum and maximum of all the proxies for well-being (2002-
2014), the proxy for political decentralisation (1997-2009), the proxies for 
governance quality (1997-2009), and the controls (1997-2009).  
Insert Table 2 around here 
Based on the summary statistics, people-related well-being (i.e. happiness- and life-
related well-being) is higher than the country-related well-being (i.e. economy-, 
government-, democracy-, education-, and health-related well-being). Moreover, 
well-being is lowest when it has to do with the government and the economy (Table 
2). Despite these differences, the Pearson correlation coefficient between these 
proxies is high (above 0.67). Considering the quality of governance, governance 
effectiveness and regulatory quality have the highest mean and political stability the 
lowest. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the different proxies for 
governance quality is also high (above 0.69). 
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3.2 Econometric specification 
In order to examine whether the relationship between well-being and political 
decentralisation (‘who’) is mediated by governance quality (‘how well’), we propose 
the following interaction model: 
 !," = #$ + #%&'()*-!,"./ + #0123(4'5!,"./ + #6&'()*-!,"./ 7 123(4'5!,"./ +
#89':;<'(>!,"./ + ?!,"./   
where Wi,t is the well-being for country i at time t; PolDeci,t-5 is the degree of political 
decentralisation for country i at time t-5, which is the main independent variable; 
QualGovi,t-5 is the governance quality for country i at time t-5, known as moderator; 
and Controlsi,t-5 represents a vector of controls (i.e. economic development, human 
capital, tfp, openness, tax, public health, unemployment and urban population) that 
may affect well-being in country i at time t-5. β0 is the constant; β1 is the coefficient 
on the PolDeci,t-5 variable; β2 is the coefficient on the QualGovi,t-5 variable; β3 is the 
coefficient on the interaction term of the political decentralisation variable with the 
quality of governance; and β4 is a vector of coefficients on the control variables. ɛi,t-5 
depicts the error term. All independent variables are time-lagged (5-year lags) in 
order to minimize the potential risk of simultaneous causation and endogeneity. 
The empirical specification is estimated by means of pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS), as the time-series variation of the political decentralisation and governance 
quality variables is very low: changes in political decentralisation and in quality of 
governance are long-run processes and happen infrequently and when they do – 
particularly in the case of decentralisation – they do so in steps. The pooled OLS 
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coefficients are interpreted as long-run effects (Mairesse 1990; Partridge 2005; 
Rodríguez-Pose, Psycharis, and Tselios 2012). Thus, the β3 coefficient, for example, 
shows the long-run joint influence of political decentralisation and quality of 
governance on subjective welfare. Finally, the stochastic part of the empirical 
specifications also includes time-dummies to control for all time-specific spatial-
invariant variables. 
 
4. Is the relationship between well-being and political decentralisation 
contingent on governance quality? 
Table 3 presents the influence of political decentralisation on well-being in European 
countries after considering the quality of local governance as a mediating factor, and 
controlling for economic development, human capital, tfp, openness, tax, public 
health, unemployment and urban population. All results in the analysis are robust to 
conducting population weighted regressions.
12
 In the unweighted regressions, each 
country is viewed as a separate realization of certain underlying economic processes 
and thus each country should be weighted the same, while in the weighted 
regressions, the emphasis is on European citizens, rather than on European countries 
(Sala-i-Martin 2003; Firebaugh 2003; Tselios et al. 2012). Finally, in all regressions 
multicollinearity tests using the variance inflation factors (VIFs) have been 
conducted. The VIF tests provide evidence that the variance of the estimated 
regression coefficients is not affected by collinearity, i.e. the VIFs do not exceed the 
                                                          
12
 The regression results weighted by population of each country and by the population size 
of the ESS survey are omitted because of space constraints and can be provided upon 
authors’ request. 
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‘rule of thumb’ value of 10. The Appendix displays the interpretation of the 
regression results using the procedures proposed by Dawson and Richter (2006). The 
figures in the Appendix show the positive or negative relationship between political 
decentralisation and the different dimensions of well-being for low and high 
government-quality countries. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
4.1 Country-related well-being variables 
The results for the different dimensions of the country-related well-being indicators 
are as follows: 
Economy-related well-being (Regressions 1-6 and figures 1-6 of Appendix): For low 
government-quality European countries, the relationship between political 
decentralisation and well-being is sensitive to the proxy for governance. For 
example, this relationship is positive when the moderator is ‘voice and 
accountability’, ‘political stability’ and ‘control of corruption’ and negative when the 
moderator is ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘rule of law’. For high government-quality 
countries, the relationship between political decentralisation and social is negative 
and weak. 
Government-related well-being (Regression 7-12 and figures 7-12 of Appendix): The 
results are robust to the proxy for government-quality: the influence of political 
decentralisation on well-being is positive for low government-quality countries and 
negative for high government-quality countries. However, the positive effect 
outweighs the negative effect. 
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Democracy-related well-being (Regressions 13-18 and figures 13-18 of Appendix): 
While for low European government-quality countries the relationship between 
decentralisation and welfare is sensitive to the proxy for governance (i.e. positive 
when the moderator is ‘voice and accountability’, and negative when the moderator 
is ‘regulatory quality’), for high government-quality countries this relationship is 
negative, weak and robust. 
Education-related well-being (Regressions 19-24 and figures 19-24 of Appendix): 
The results are very similar to the government-related well-being ones, i.e. the 
influence of political decentralisation on well-being is positive for low government-
quality countries and negative for high government-quality countries. This influence 
is robust to the proxy for government-quality. Moreover, the positive effect 
outweighs the negative effect. 
Health-related well-being (Regressions 25-30 and figures 25-30 of Appendix): The 
results are opposite to those reported for the education- and government-related 
well-being. The effect of political decentralisation on well-being is negative for low 
government-quality countries and positive for high government-quality countries. 
4.2 People-related well-being variables 
The results for the life- and happiness-related well-being variables are as follows: 
Life-related well-being (Regressions 31-36 and figures 31-36 of Appendix): The 
results show that an increase in political decentralisation for European countries 
with low quality of governance leads to higher well-being outcomes when the quality 
of governance is proxied by ‘voice and accountability’, ‘government effectiveness’, 
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‘rule of law’ and ‘control of corruption’. ‘Political stability’ has less of an effect on 
life-related well-being, while an increase in political decentralisation for countries 
with high quality of governance leads to a small reduction in welfare for almost all 
proxies for quality of governance. 
Happiness-related well-being (Regressions 37-42 and figures 37-42 of Appendix): 
The results virtually reproduce those of the life-related well-being variable. An 
increase in political decentralisation in European countries with low quality of 
governance leads to higher well-being outcomes when the quality of governance is 
proxied by ‘voice and accountability’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘rule of law’ and 
‘control of corruption’ and less by ‘political stability’. By contrast, an increase in 
political decentralisation in countries with high quality of governance leads to a small 
reduction in welfare for almost all proxies for quality of governance. 
Controls (Regressions 1-42): The coefficients of the country control variables 
generally keep the same sign and level of significance, regardless of the dimension of 
well-being considered. The main exceptions are tax revenue and unemployment 
levels, whose association with well-being very much depends on the specific 
dimension of welfare analysed. In general, the results in Table 3 show that an 
increase in economic development, urbanisation and openness of a country leads to 
a higher level of well-being. In contrast, increases in tfp contribute to lower well-
being outcomes. Of the other control variables, educational endowment displays a 
positive and significant coefficient in five of the seven well-being dimensions 
considered, as is the case of public health, albeit with a negative sign. The 
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coefficients for tax revenue and unemployment are much more sensitive to the 
proxy for well-being and/or to the proxy for quality of governance. 
Overall, the relationship between political decentralisation and well-being in Europe 
is contingent on the quality of governance after controlling for a wide range of 
national factors. The results point to the fact that decentralisation per se is not well-
being enhancing and that its impact is strongly mediated by the governance quality 
in a particular country. Hence, the influence of ‘who’ delivers the resources on 
welfare depends on ‘how well’ the resources are delivered. This is hardly surprising 
taking into account that there are both benefits and costs linked to decentralisation. 
For low government-quality countries (especially in countries with low voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law and control of 
corruption, i.e. five out of sex pillars), an increase in political decentralisation is 
generally connected to improvements in life-, government-, education-, and 
happiness-related well-being, but to a reduction in health-related well-being. 
Political decentralisation can thus be regarded as generally well-being-enhancing 
with the exception of health-related subjective welfare. Therefore, in countries with 
low-quality governance systems, delivering public goods and services at the 
subnational level may be, as a whole, more welfare enhancing than having it done by 
central governments. However, the results for the provision of health public goods 
and services sent a warning sign that decentralisation may not work in all cases. For 
countries with high levels of government quality (especially those with high voice 
and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption, i.e. all pillars) increases in political 
decentralisation do not necessarily lead to improvements in well-being. The results 
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point to a small reduction in life-, economy-, government-, democracy-, education-, 
and happiness-related well-being. Health-related well-being, by contrast, increases 
when delivered locally. Hence, in countries with a strong governance record, political 
decentralisation is unlikely to improve what is already a fair and efficient distribution 
of public goods and services behind increases in well-being. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines – using Amartya Sen’s conceptual framework of social welfare – 
the influence of political decentralisation (‘who’ delivers public goods and services) 
and the role of governance quality (indicating ‘how well’ they are delivered) on 
different dimensions of well-being across European countries for the period between 
1997 and 2014. By using variations of Amartya Sen’s social welfare index in order to 
proxy for seven different dimensions of well-being, we pay more attention to 
neglected aspects of well-being, such as attitudes and emotional status. However, 
this approach may also render the analysis somewhat vulnerable, as, although there 
is a strong relationship between how people say they feel and how their ‘happiness’ 
or ‘life satisfaction’ is rated by their friends or by independent observers (Layard 
2006), this may not always be the case. Hence, relying only on people’s subjective 
perception of their own well-being represents a limitation, as individuals may have 
different concepts of ‘happiness’ or ‘life satisfaction’. 
Taking this caveat into account, the results of the econometric analysis give clear 
European policy implications. Governance quality is crucial to the decentralisation-
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welfare association. The results indicate that there is no guarantee that a more 
decentralised country will end up with higher well-being, as the influence of political 
decentralisation is shaped by the governance quality. The public goods and services 
at the base of well-being are affected by both ‘who’ delivers and ‘how well’ they are 
delivered. The results point towards the fact that in countries with low quality 
governance, more decentralized government systems may contribute to the creation 
of more efficient systems of public goods and service provision, leading to well-
being-enhancing results across the board, with the only exception of health-related 
well-being. In countries with high quality of governance and where the provision of 
public goods and services is generally more efficient and equitable, political 
decentralisation will not have the same effects. While a more decentralised service 
delivery may guarantee greater satisfaction with health care, there is no evidence 
that providing decentralised public goods and services in high quality governance will 
have an influence over other aspects of well-being. 
Consequently, when considering decentralisation as a potential tool to tackle well-
being problems, it has to be borne in mind that the influence of decentralisation on 
well-being will be highly dependent on the quality of the government tier providing 
the public goods and services – i.e. the impact of ‘who’ delivers is strongly 
determined by ‘how well’ the public goods and services are delivered. Hence, it is 
not surprising that decentralisation may only lead to considerable improvements in 
well-being when the capacity of the national government to supply public goods and 
services efficiently and fairly is limited. When a high governance quality guarantees a 
fair and efficient provision of such goods, the benefits of decentralisation for overall 
well-being are bound to be limited.  
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These conclusions have to be taken with some caveats in mind. The cross-country 
and time-series nature of the paper and constraints on data availability and quality 
mean that further analyses both using objective indicators as well as covering 
alternative territorial dimensions can provide complementary views to this picture. 
Further research at the regional level, for example, could complete the views 
emerging the country-level analysis we have conducted. Research at the regional 
level will allow to take into account factors such as regional differences in well-being, 
political decentralisation and government quality, among others, and to explore how 
regional disparities between each country could affect the findings of this paper. 
Finally, our estimates could be refined by considering not only data spanning longer 
periods but also a larger sample of countries. This is very important because the 
external validity of the findings of this paper might be challenged by the fact that, for 
example, institutional quality varies considerably across countries and regions.      
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Table 1: Well-being proxies 
Proxy Definition Measurement of efficiency and inequality 
Life-related well-
being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of life satisfaction of 
individuals within a given 
population and of the 
inequalities in life satisfaction 
that exist. 
Life-satisfaction efficiency is measured by the average life 
satisfaction of people within a country, based on the 
question ‘how satisfied are you with life as a whole?’ 
(answers range from 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 
‘extremely satisfied’). Life-satisfaction inequality is 
measured by means of the interpersonal Gini coefficient 
on life satisfaction. 
Economy-related 
well-being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of economic satisfaction 
of individuals within a given 
country and the inequalities in 
economy satisfaction. 
Economic satisfaction efficiency is measured by the 
average economy satisfaction of individuals within a 
country, based on the question ‘how satisfied are you 
with the present state of economy in your country?’ 
(answers range from 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 
‘extremely satisfied’). Economic satisfaction inequality is 
measured using the interpersonal Gini coefficient on 
economy satisfaction. 
Government-
related well-
being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of national-government 
satisfaction of individuals 
within a given population and 
the inequalities in national-
government satisfaction that 
exist. 
Government-satisfaction efficiency is measured by the 
average national-government satisfaction of people 
within a country, based on the question ‘how satisfied 
are you with the national government?’ (answers range 
from 0 ‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘extremely 
satisfied’). Government-satisfaction inequality is 
measured by the interpersonal Gini coefficient on 
national-government satisfaction. 
Democracy-
related well-
being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of satisfaction with 
democracy of individuals within 
a given population and the 
inequalities in satisfaction with 
democracy that exist. 
The question ‘how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in your country?’ (answers range from 0 
‘extremely dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘extremely satisfied’) is used 
to measure democracy-satisfaction efficiency. The 
interpersonal Gini coefficient on satisfaction with 
democracy is employed for measuring democracy-related 
satisfaction inequality. 
Education-related 
well-being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of the state of education 
within a given population and 
of the inequalities in the state 
of education. 
Education efficiency is measured by the average state of 
education of people in a given country, based on the 
question ‘how satisfied are you with the state of 
education in your country nowadays?’ (answers range 
from 0 ‘extremely bad’ to 10 ‘extremely good’). Education 
inequality is measured by means of the interpersonal Gini 
coefficient on the state of education. 
Health-related 
well-being 
It is measured by combining 
the average levels of the state 
of health services within a 
given country and the 
inequalities in health services. 
Health efficiency is estimated using the average state of 
health services within a country, based on the question 
‘how satisfied are you with the state of the health services 
in your country nowadays?’ (answers range from 0 
‘extremely bad’ to 10 ‘extremely good’). Health inequality 
is measured using the interpersonal Gini coefficient on 
the state of health services. 
Happiness-
related well-
being 
It is a function of the average 
levels of the happiness of 
individuals within a given 
country and the inequalities in 
happiness across the country. 
Happiness efficiency is measured using the average 
happiness of the individuals sampled within a country, 
based on the question ‘how happy are you?’ (answers 
range from 0 ‘extremely unhappy’ to 10 ‘extremely 
happy’). Happiness inequality is measured by the 
interpersonal Gini coefficient on happiness. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Well-being 
      Life-related 2002-2014 308 5.8157 1.1351 2.9230 7.8756 
Economy-related 2002-2014 308 3.4686 1.3706 0.8966 7.1210 
Government-related 2002-2014 306 3.1949 1.0259 1.0226 5.7001 
Democracy-related 2002-2014 308 4.1072 1.1833 1.6379 6.5148 
Education-related 2002-2014 308 4.4941 1.1032 2.1637 7.3906 
Health-related 2002-2014 308 4.1400 1.2938 1.6512 6.9686 
Happiness-related 2002-2014 308 6.2330 0.8975 3.9142 7.7707 
PolDec 
      RAI total 1997-2009 442 11.8082 10.3572 1.0000 36.9899 
QualGov 
      Voice and accountability 1997-2009 468 0.9352 0.6518 -1.5488 1.8264 
Political stability 1997-2009 457 0.6167 0.7341 -1.6230 1.6681 
Gov. effectiveness 1997-2009 459 1.0359 0.8549 -0.9168 2.3566 
Regulatory quality 1997-2009 458 1.0324 0.6291 -0.7421 2.0766 
Rule of law 1997-2009 462 0.8925 0.8779 -1.2445 1.9996 
Control of corruption 1997-2009 462 0.9323 1.0399 -1.1547 2.5856 
Controls 
      GDP per capita (ln) 1997-2009 455 10.1030 0.5815 8.2489 11.3435 
Human capital per person 1997-2009 455 3.0641 0.3476 1.9099 3.6833 
Welfare-relevant tfp 1997-2009 442 0.9801 0.1427 0.4333 1.3180 
Openness (ln) 1997-2009 455 4.4402 0.4209 3.3660 5.7886 
Tax revenue 1997-2009 433 20.1180 7.3638 0.5342 49.9678 
Public health expenditure 1997-2009 455 71.6407 12.0309 26.7506 92.4834 
Unemployment (ln) 1997-2009 455 1.9856 0.5029 0.5878 3.1224 
Urban population 1997-2009 455 71.1861 12.0744 40.0350 97.5940 
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Table 3: Regression results 
 
Country-related well-being variables 
 
a) Dependent variable: economy-related well-being 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0209 -0.0099 -0.0093 -0.0430** -0.0196 0.0007 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 1.2562***      
Political stability  0.6752***     
Gov. effectiveness   0.6220**    
Regulatory quality    0.0885   
Rule of law     0.3847  
Control of corruption      0.6225*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0307 -0.0128 -0.0054 0.0203 0.0029 -0.0106 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 1.5514*** 1.7583*** 1.5223*** 1.9344*** 1.6443*** 1.4427*** 
Human capital per person 0.7516*** 0.7464*** 0.5037*** 0.4060** 0.4801*** 0.5215*** 
Welfare-relevant tfp -4.0163*** -3.8488*** -4.1626*** -4.4516*** -4.2894*** -3.9603*** 
Openness (ln) 0.6468*** 0.4737*** 0.6460*** 0.6138*** 0.6842*** 0.7682*** 
Tax revenue -0.0003 0.0024 -0.0030 0.0019 0.0004 -0.0037 
Public health expenditure -0.0159** -0.0187*** -0.0098* -0.0071 -0.0100 -0.0110** 
Unemployment (ln) 0.1800 0.2584 0.1414 0.1901 0.1661 0.1955 
Urban population 0.0263*** 0.0355*** 0.0189*** 0.0247*** 0.0239*** 0.0189*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -15.9168*** -17.1295*** -13.8285*** -17.3700*** -15.1808*** -13.8516*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.6622 0.6706 0.6551 0.6513 0.6520 0.6620 
 
b) Dependent variable: government-related well-being 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0764*** 0.0043 0.0303** 0.0132 0.0226* 0.0325*** 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 1.7530***      
Political stability  0.7166***     
Gov. effectiveness   1.0012***    
Regulatory quality    0.6027**   
Rule of law (ln)     0.8109***  
Control of corruption      0.8747*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0720*** -0.0262*** -0.0280*** -0.0181 -0.0250*** -0.0289*** 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 0.8699*** 1.1330*** 0.6743*** 1.1609*** 0.8270*** 0.6724*** 
Human capital per person 0.5359*** 0.5283*** 0.2171 0.2055 0.2933* 0.3057** 
Welfare-relevant tfp -2.5725*** -2.8267*** -3.1037*** -3.2158*** -3.0378*** -2.8657*** 
Openness (ln) 0.6792*** 0.4854*** 0.6522*** 0.5639*** 0.6664*** 0.7485*** 
Tax revenue -0.0096 -0.0053 -0.0140** -0.0078 -0.0106* -0.0150** 
Public health expenditure -0.0321*** -0.0344*** -0.0258*** -0.0231*** -0.0273*** -0.0273*** 
Unemployment (ln) 0.1358 0.1299 0.0299 0.0557 0.0750 0.0731 
Urban population 0.0289*** 0.0362*** 0.0183*** 0.0233*** 0.0231*** 0.0178*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -9.2764*** -9.7372*** -4.3477 -8.9264*** -6.3423** -5.0478** 
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 
R-squared 0.5892 0.5889 0.5790 0.5556 0.5649 0.5925 
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Table 3: Regression results (cont.) 
c) Dependent variable: democracy-related well-being 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0268* -0.0124** -0.0070 -0.0409*** -0.0101 -0.0069 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 1.5254***      
Political stability  0.5265***     
Gov. effectiveness   0.8635***    
Regulatory quality    0.3265   
Rule of law (ln)     0.7193***  
Control of corruption      0.6545*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0326** -0.0051 -0.0044 0.0224** -0.0005 -0.0021 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 1.2604*** 1.6749*** 1.1217*** 1.6440*** 1.1792*** 1.1312*** 
Human capital per person 0.4964*** 0.3618** 0.1826 0.0671 0.1808 0.1327 
Welfare-relevant tfp -2.3870*** -2.1254*** -2.6001*** -2.9747*** -2.7224*** -2.4577*** 
Openness (ln) 0.2979** 0.1592 0.2941** 0.2490** 0.3745*** 0.4364*** 
Tax revenue -0.0006 0.0011 -0.0044 0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0033 
Public health expenditure -0.0231*** -0.0212*** -0.0160*** -0.0126** -0.0174*** -0.0161*** 
Unemployment (ln) 0.1239 0.2086* 0.0735 0.1476 0.1171 0.1471 
Urban population 0.0298*** 0.0375*** 0.0194*** 0.0266*** 0.0259*** 0.0217*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -11.4600*** -14.4112*** -7.8091*** -12.4834*** -8.9296*** -8.6204*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.7356 0.7182 0.7286 0.7198 0.7244 0.7371 
 
d) Dependent variable: education-related well-being 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0747*** -0.0057 0.0096 0.0070 0.0331*** 0.0292** 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 2.4930***      
Political stability  1.2758***     
Gov. effectiveness   1.3196***    
Regulatory quality    1.1234***   
Rule of law (ln)     1.5217***  
Control of corruption      1.2194*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0841*** -0.0379*** -0.0255** -0.0250** -0.0449*** -0.0382*** 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 0.7105*** 1.0742*** 0.5265*** 1.1157*** 0.5291*** 0.5912*** 
Human capital per person 0.6222*** 0.6830*** 0.1482 0.1461 0.3477** 0.3072** 
Welfare-relevant tfp -1.9276*** -1.9073*** -2.5021*** -2.6507*** -2.1338*** -1.8840*** 
Openness (ln) 0.8045*** 0.4943*** 0.7717*** 0.6702*** 0.8883*** 0.9737*** 
Tax revenue 0.0013 0.0077 -0.0046 0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0066 
Public health expenditure -0.0106* -0.0170*** -0.0002 0.0027 -0.0055 -0.0027 
Unemployment (ln) 0.3562** 0.4342*** 0.2305 0.2966** 0.3376** 0.3297** 
Urban population 0.0282*** 0.0435*** 0.0135** 0.0193*** 0.0190*** 0.0135** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -10.9976*** -12.4798*** -5.1299** -11.1085*** -7.0511*** -7.6199*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.6170 0.6600 0.5942 0.5756 0.5961 0.6123 
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Table 3: Regression results (cont.) 
e) Dependent variable: health-related well-being 
 (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
PolDec       
RAI total -0.0430** -0.0040 -0.0241* -0.0690*** -0.0045 0.0062 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability -0.0133      
Political stability  -0.0351     
Gov. effectiveness   0.6580***    
Regulatory quality    -0.5644**   
Rule of law (ln)     0.5360**  
Control of corruption      0.5005*** 
PolDec x QualGov 0.0431*** 0.0174** 0.0238*** 0.0595*** 0.0136 0.0048 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 0.7666*** 1.0249*** 0.1299 1.0995*** 0.3352 0.3803* 
Human capital per person -0.1661 -0.2553 -0.2664* -0.3551** -0.2381 -0.2375 
Welfare-relevant tfp -2.1600*** -1.3370* -2.3052*** -2.0128*** -2.0346*** -1.5501** 
Openness (ln) 0.2561** 0.3137** 0.2428** 0.3644*** 0.4201*** 0.4844*** 
Tax revenue -0.0023 -0.0046 -0.0050 -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0050 
Public health expenditure 0.0004 0.0037 0.0003 0.0046 -0.0011 -0.0001 
Unemployment (ln) -0.2692** -0.1293 -0.2733** -0.1259 -0.1932 -0.1393 
Urban population 0.0528*** 0.0557*** 0.0430*** 0.0570*** 0.0520*** 0.0485*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.7096** -9.7865*** 1.0964 -9.2729*** -2.6542 -3.7313 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.6892 0.6622 0.7268 0.6829 0.6934 0.6893 
 
People-related well-being variables 
 
f) Dependent variable: life-related well-being 
 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0310* -0.0013 0.0216** -0.0378*** 0.0194* 0.0232*** 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 1.4343***      
Political stability  0.4763***     
Gov. effectiveness   1.1829***    
Regulatory quality    0.2736   
Rule of law     1.0567***  
Control of corruption      0.9709*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0305** -0.0124* -0.0187*** 0.0254*** -0.0173** -0.0177*** 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 1.1369*** 1.6220*** 0.7850*** 1.4888*** 0.8632*** 0.7837*** 
Human capital per person 0.6900*** 0.6384*** 0.4285*** 0.2654** 0.4837*** 0.4401*** 
Welfare-relevant tfp -1.7443*** -1.2835** -1.8303*** -2.3802*** -1.8653*** -1.5991*** 
Openness (ln) 0.3043*** 0.2470** 0.3378*** 0.2523** 0.4151*** 0.4993*** 
Tax revenue 0.0168*** 0.0187*** 0.0109** 0.0199*** 0.0157*** 0.0112** 
Public health expenditure -0.0152*** -0.0136*** -0.0100*** -0.0051 -0.0125*** -0.0110*** 
Unemployment (ln) 0.2472** 0.3339*** 0.1994* 0.2688** 0.2631** 0.2800** 
Urban population 0.0199*** 0.0263*** 0.0076** 0.0170*** 0.0145*** 0.0088** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -10.2993*** -14.6656*** -5.1395** -10.9864*** -6.7078*** -6.0554*** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.7595 0.7297 0.7706 0.7477 0.7594 0.7866 
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Table 3: Regression results (cont.) 
g) Dependent variable: happiness-related well-being 
 (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
PolDec       
RAI total 0.0142 -0.0039 0.0127 -0.0325*** 0.0128 0.0142* 
QualGov       
Voice and accountability 1.0188***      
Political stability  0.2920***     
Gov. effectiveness   0.9640***    
Regulatory quality    0.2244   
Rule of law (ln)     0.8513***  
Control of corruption      0.7351*** 
PolDec x QualGov -0.0160* -0.0064 -0.0120** 0.0219*** -0.0118** -0.0114** 
Controls       
GDP per capita (ln) 1.0074*** 1.4183*** 0.6574*** 1.2635*** 0.7414*** 0.7266*** 
Human capital per person 0.2201** 0.1660* 0.0261 -0.0981 0.0710 0.0316 
Welfare-relevant tfp -1.6485*** -1.1867*** -1.7046*** -2.0868*** -1.7020*** -1.4632*** 
Openness (ln) 0.1430* 0.1290 0.1708** 0.1147 0.2464*** 0.3086*** 
Tax revenue 0.0082** 0.0091** 0.0034 0.0107*** 0.0073** 0.0039 
Public health expenditure -0.0089*** -0.0068** -0.0054** -0.0015 -0.0074*** -0.0059** 
Unemployment (ln) 0.1674* 0.2450*** 0.1342* 0.2005** 0.1905** 0.2080** 
Urban population 0.0176*** 0.0219*** 0.0074** 0.0155*** 0.0135*** 0.0094*** 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5.9881*** -9.9951*** -1.3427 -6.6279*** -2.9456* -2.9070** 
Observations 294 294 294 294 294 294 
R-squared 0.7871 0.7483 0.8079 0.7790 0.7920 0.8120 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: Interpretation of the regression results 
COUNTRY-RELATED WELL-BEING VARIABLES 
a) Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
(1) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(2) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
3) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(4) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(5) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(6) 
Dependent variable: Economy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
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b) Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
(7) 
Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(8) 
Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(9) 
Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(10) 
Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(11) 
Dependent variable: Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(12) 
Dependent variable Government-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
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c) Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
(13) 
Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(14) 
Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(15) 
Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(16) 
Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(17) 
Dependent variable: Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(18) 
Dependent variable Democracy-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
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d) Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
(19) 
Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(20) 
Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(21) 
Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(22) 
Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(23) 
Dependent variable: Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(24) 
Dependent variable Education-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
  
 
  
44 
 
e) Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
(25) 
Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(26) 
Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(27) 
Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(28) 
Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(29) 
Dependent variable: Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(30) 
Dependent variable Health-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
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PEOPLE-RELATED WELL-BEING VARIABLES 
f) Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
(31) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(32) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(33) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(34) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(35) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(36) 
Dependent variable: Life-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
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g) Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
(37) 
Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Voice and accountability 
(38) 
Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Political stability 
  
(39) 
Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Gov. effectiveness 
(40) 
Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Regulatory quality 
  
(41) 
Dependent variable: Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Rule of law 
(42) 
Dependent variable Happiness-related well-being 
Independent variable: RAI total 
Moderator: Control of corruption 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
